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Applications of a Contemporary 
Partnership Model for Divorce 
Cynthia Starnes* 
She rose to his requirement, dropped 
The playthings of her life 
To take the honorable work 
Of woman and of wife. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For over twenty years, large numbers of women who 
perform the "honorable work . . . of wife" have been sacrificed 
to no-fault's selective partnership model of divorce. 2 Some of 
these women are America's former heroines-homemakers of 
the "Betty Crocker" era. Others are younger, wage-earning 
wives whose marketplace participation has been limited by 
their primary caretaking responsibilities, often involving 
children. Each group of women has been hard-hit by the no-
fault preference for a clean break and the consequent 
reluctance of courts to order substantial maintenance. Efforts 
to "repair" such caretakers through brief awards of 
"rehabilitative" maintenance have served primarily to soothe 
the no-fault conscience while caretakers continue to descend 
into poverty. This situation has prompted some commentators 
to counsel abandonment of the partnership model of divorce. 
The problem, however, is not with partnership law. Rather, 
the problem is with no-fault's selective incorporation of 
partnership principles. The resulting model speaks to the 
' Professor, Detroit College of Law. The author first proposed the 
contemporary partnership model for divorce in a more detailed article entitled 
Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing 
with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 67 (1993). 
1 THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKENSON 359 (1960). 
2 In this article, I presume that a spouse who performs caretaking chores is 
female. While some men certainly do assume the role of full-time or primary 
caretaker, their numbers are small. See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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termination of an ideal marriage, while dangerously ignoring 
real marriage. Partnership law can do much better. Indeed, 
broad use of partnership principles produces a no-fault model 
that both encourages the ideal in marriage and sensibly 
addresses the real. Under such a contemporary partnership 
model, divorce is seen as the dissociation of a spouse from a 
shared enterprise. While dissociation ends the relationship, it 
does not usually trigger a winding-up of any shared enterprise 
in which the spouses have invested. If this enterprise 
continues, a dissociated spouse should receive a buyout of her 
interest. This buyout right provides a theoretical basis for 
maintenance. It also provides an easily applied, presumptive 
method for calculating an appropriate amount of maintenance, 
thus limiting the broad judicial discretion that now makes 
divorce orders unpredictable, invites gender bias, and impedes 
meaningful negotiations between the parties.3 
Section II of this article will discuss ideals in contemporary 
marriage. Section III will discuss realities of contemporary 
marriage. Finally, section IV will illustrate the contemporary 
partnership model by applying it to a paradigmatic marriage: 
(1) the traditional marriage, (2) the hybrid marriage, and (3) 
the egalitarian marriage. Section IV will discuss two variations 
involving the caretaker who outpaces her spouse in the market 
and the childless caretaker. This illustration will demonstrate 
the efficacy of a contemporary partnership model in addressing 
both the real and the ideal marriage. 
II. IDEALS IN CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE-ARE WE ONE 
FLESH? 
Concepts of marriage have changed dramatically in recent 
decades. No longer is marriage viewed as a Blackstonian 
merging of husband and wife into one flesh-the husband's. 4 
And gone is the day when marriage imposed a lifetime duty on 
a husband to support his wife. Today's ideal marriage is an 
"egalitarian relationship with equal sharing of responsibility 
for decision making."5 During this marriage, spouses function 
3 For a discussion of the problems of broad judicial discretion in divorce, 
see Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, A Discourse on 
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. 
CHI. 1. REV. 67, 92-95, 101-06 (1993). 
4 HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 175 
(3d ed. 1990). See also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442 (Layston Press 
1966) (1765) (the husband and wife are one person in law). 
5 Gregg Temple, Freedom of Contract and Intimate RPlationships, 8 HARV. 
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as a partnership, sharing resources, responsibilities, and 
risks, 6 a framework that encourages cooperation and 
caretaking commitments.7 Although such a marriage hardly 
mirrors Blackstone's view, its emphasis on the unit over the 
individual reflects the Biblical image of spouses as "one 
flesh"8-the unit's. 
No-fault's partnership model for divorce presumes this 
ideal marriage. In tune with egalitarian principles, no-fault 
adopts the partnership concept that any partner can leave the 
partnership at will,9 thus dissolving the relationship and 
triggering liquidation of assets, payment of debts, and 
distribution of remaining proceeds to the partners. 10 This 
winding-up11 of the partnership concludes the partners' rights 
and obligations. 12 Consistent with these selected partnership 
rules, no-fault divorce occasions division of marital property, 
after which marital partners, like commercial partners, leave 
the partnership free to begin new ventures without any 
lingering entanglements. 13 
If spouses are indeed partners who share equally the 
advantages and disadvantages of participation in a failed 
marriage, this simple no-fault scheme makes some sense. 
Unfortunately, most couples fall far short of achieving an ideal 
J.L. & PuB. PoL 'y 121, 152 (1985). 
6 Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questions 
the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE 
CROSSROADS 191, 198 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) ("the 
ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal partnerships between spouses 
who share resources, responsibilities, and risks"). 
7 ld. at 199. 
8 Genesis 2:24. 
9 See UN!F. PROB. CODE §§ ::ll, 32, 6 U.L.A. 376, 394 (1969) (providing that 
a partnership dissolves upon the at-will departure of a partner); see also UNIF. 
PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 29, 31, 6 U.L.A. 364, 376 (1969) (stating the unalterable right 
of a partner to dissolve the partnership at any time). 
10 See HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF 
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 345 (2d ed. 1990). 
11 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 30, 6 U.L.A. 367 (1969) (distinguishes 
between a dissolution and a winding up: "On dissolution the partnership is not 
terminated but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is 
completed."); see also UN!F. PARNERSHIP AcT § 29 commentary at 9, cmt. b, 6 
U.L.A. 365 (1969) (defining "winding up" as the "process of settling partnership 
affairs after dissolution"). 
12 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. R!BSTEIN, BROMBERG AND R!BSTEIN 
ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.08 (1991). 
13 See U.M.D.A., Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 149 (1987): "the distribution of 
property upon termination of a marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, 
like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership." 
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marnage. 
III. REALITIES OF CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE-WHO MAKEs 
THE BED AND How MUCH DOES IT CosT? 
Despite the popular rhetoric of equality, the reality is that 
contemporary marriage is not ideal marriage-it is still a 
gender-biased institution. Who makes the bed? In most homes, 
the honest response is that the wife does. Indeed, there is 
evidence that only one husband in twenty makes the bed in 
which he sleeps. 14 "Making the bed" is only a euphemism for 
the many endless responsibilities involved in caretaking-the 
cooking, the cleaning, the washing, the shopping, the caring for 
children or aging parents. 
For many wives, such caretaking is a full-time job. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that in 1991 approximately 
sixteen million women-as against only 415,000 men-were not 
in the labor force because they were "keeping house."15 Even a 
wife who works outside the home is likely to undertake a 
disproportionately large share of caretaking responsibilities. 
One study indicates that women remain responsible for 
approximately seventy percent of the housework and working 
wives spend twice as much time on caretaking tasks as 
working husbands. 16 Whether she is a full-time or part-time 
worker, Betty Crocker remains very much a part of most 
American marriages. 
How much does it cost a woman to "make the beds?" The 
quick, if superficial, response of many men is likely to be: very 
little or nothing. In the words of a New York legislator: 
The perception of most men-and the judiciary is mostly 
male-is that care of the house and children can be done with 
14 DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
LAW 174 (1989). 
lfi BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEfY!'. OF LABOR, 39 
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 204, at tbl. 35 (1992). In 1991, there were 51.5 
million married women in the United States. !d. In that same year, 22.7 million 
women (married or unmarried) stayed out of the labor force because they were 
"keeping house." An additional 1.2 million wanted a job, but did not look for one 
because of "home responsibility." !d. 
Moreover, at least 50% of wage-earning women report having previously 
dropped out of the labor force because of family reasons, as compared to one 
percent of all wage-earning men. RHODE, supra note 14, at 174. 
16 RHODE, supra note 14, at 174; 1we also SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE 
UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN, at xiv (1991) (noting that the only 
major change in the last fifteen years is that now middle class men think they do 
more around the house). 
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one hand tied behind the back. Send the kids out to school, 
put them to bed, and the rest of the time [is] free to play 
tennis and bridge. 17 
111 
Actually, primary caretakers pay a high price for their 
efforts in the home. Mincer and Polacheck report that women 
who remain out of the labor market after the birth of their first 
child suffer a decline in earning capacity of about 1.5% per 
year. 18 Because of her family responsibilities, the wage-
earning caretaker has less time to devote to a career, which 
often limits her career choice and opportunities for 
advancement. The Bureau of the Census confirms that many 
wage-earning women "choose work that will fit around ... 
their family responsibilities, a complication and impediment to 
occupational advancement not faced by most men."19 Not 
surprisingly, many caretakers are channeled into the secondary 
job market, where wages are low and opportunities for 
advancement minimal. The division of labor in the home thus 
exacts a high toll from women and contributes to the disparity 
in men's and women's wages. 
When a caretaker divorces, she loses her male buffer and 
is thrust into the market economy where she alone faces the 
cost of her caretaking role. No-fault's partnership model, 
however, fails to acknowledge her situation, instead assuming 
the ideal where spouses are equal partners who can begin new 
lives on an equal footing. Herein lies a dangerous reverie of 
denial-"Women aren't caretakers; caretaking doesn't take 
time; caretaking doesn't disadvantage women; any 
disadvantage will disappear m the blink of an eye 
(rehabilitative maintenance)."20 
17 Lynn H. Schatran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task 
Force Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 280, 285 (1987) (quoting a New York legislator). 
18 Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: 
Earnings of Women, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN AND 
HUMAN CAPITAL 397, 415 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974). Women with advanced 
degrees suffer an even higher rate of depreciation. !d. For a discussion of the 
difficulties faced by a homemaker entering the market after full-time homemaking, 
see Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on 
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 67, 81-85 (1993). 
19 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPr. OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-
23, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 7 (1986). 
20 See Starnes, supra note 18, at 97-101 (addressing the illusion that 
rehabilitative maintenance can achieve equity for a caretaker); see also Ann L. 
Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. 
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No-fault also erroneously supposes that dissolution of the 
marital partnership necessarily terminates the marital 
enterprise. In fact, this is hardly ever the case. Because a 
commercial partnership also often continues after a partner 
leaves, partnership law provides rules for these situations.21 
These rules provide a rich model for divorce. 
IV. A CONTEMPORARY PARTNERSHIP MODEL-DISSOCIATION 
AND BUYOUT 
In the common case in which partnership business 
continues after a partner's dissociation, the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act (RUPA) requires remaining partners to buy 
out the interest of the dissociated partner.22 The buyout price 
reflects the dissociated partner's interest in the continuing 
partnership. This buyout rule provides a conceptual basis for 
maintenance. 
As in a commercial partnership, a spouse's dissociation 
terminates the relationship but does not necessarily trigger a 
winding-up of the marital enterprise. If this enterprise 
continues, a dissociated spouse should receive a buyout of her 
interest. 
But what is a marital enterprise? Simply stated, it is the 
income-generating activity of the marriage. The value of this 
enterprise is measured by the spouses' enhanced human capital 
attributable to marital investment. While the marital unit may 
invest in a spouses' human capital through education or 
training, more often an investment occurs simply through the 
expenditure of time and effort in the market, which results in 
experience and perhaps seniority. Whether the marital unit 
invests in the human capital of one or both spouses, these 
investments are jointly made in the expectation, express or 
implied, that they will generate a return that will be jointly 
enjoyed. 
Although dissociation terminates the parties' marriage, it 
usually does not terminate this income-generating marital 
enterprise, which continues to function in the marketplace as 
REV. 721 (1993) (documenting how maintenance law takes little account of younger 
caregivers and advocating shifts in the law to rehabilitate family care values). 
21 See Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream: 
Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. R25, 837 (1990). 
22 See REV. UNIF. PARTNERSIIIP ACT § 701 (199:i); seP also UN!F. 
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(a), 6 U.L.A. 456 (1969) (requiring a buyout of the interest 
of a departing partner in certain instances). 
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one or both spouses generate income attributable to marital 
investments. If, for example, the husband works outside the 
home and the wife works in the home, the marital unit invests 
exclusively in the human capital of the husband. While the 
husband and wife both labor for the benefit of the unit, only 
the husband experiences an enhanced ability to generate 
income. If the marriage ends, the husband takes this marital 
enterprise with him and should buy out the wife's interest. 
A. Calculating a Buyout 
The buyout price should be set at the time of divorce in 
order to afford spouses the emotional and financial planning 
benefits of a clean break. Determining this buyout price re-
quires two steps: ( 1) estimating the value of the marital enter-
prise and (2) fixing a dissociated spouse's share of that value. 
Value lies in the parties' enhanced ability to generate income 
attributable to marital investment. One might presumptively 
estimate this value by approximating each party's future earn-
ings (by averaging income over a previous period, e.g., three to 
five years) and then reducing that figure to roughly measure 
enhancement (by subtracting earnings at marriage).23 This 
simple method of estimating value would maximize predictabil-
ity and minimize costs for the parties. 
Valuation of the marital enterprise triggers the second step 
in the buyout calculation-determining the share of that enter-
prise due a dissociated spouse. This buyout share should de-
pend on marriage duration since the length of the marriage 
roughly reflects the extent of a spouse's investment and, in the 
case of a primary caretaker, her opportunity costs. The Uni-
form Probate Code (UPC) offers a reasonable model for estab-
lishing such a sliding-scale buyout share. The UPC bases a 
spouse's elective share of an augmented estate on the length of 
the marriage as a "first step in the overall plan of implement-
ing a partnership or marital-sharing theory of marriage, with a 
support theory back-up."24 Under such a sliding scale model, a 
spouse who dissociates from a one-year marriage, for example, 
would receive only three percent of any disparity in enhanced 
earnings, while a spouse who dissociates after fifteen years of 
23 All figures represent net income and are adjusted to current dollars. For 
a more detailed description of the buyout calculation, see Starnes, supra note 18, 
at 131-38. 
24 UNIFORM PROB. CODE § 2-201 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 88, 89 (1983 & Supp. 1992). 
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marriage would receive fifty percent of any disparity.25 
While this buyout calculation will produce a reasonable 
buyout price in most cases, it raises a couple of concerns. Most 
obviously, what if estimated income is not realized? Predicting 
future earnings is a necessarily speculative process; a paying 
spouse may die, become disabled, lose his job, retire, or under-
take low-paying, public service employment. Investing in the 
human capital of another person is risky business. The possibil-
ity that expected income will not materialize is a risk a spouse 
assumes both during and after marriage. Thus, the buyout 
price should be modifiable upon a substantial change in the 
payor's circumstance.26 
One might also question the presumption that enhanced 
income during marriage results from marital investment. While 
it is true that investments in human capital may actually occur 
over the course of a lifetime,27 any unfairness in discounting 
most such long-term investments is greatly reduced by inclu-
sion of marriage duration in the buyout calculation. The extent 
of marital investment, as measured by marriage duration, will 
ordinarily correlate with the amount of enhanced earnings and 
will define the buyout share. A one-year marriage, for example, 
25 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-201, 8 U.L.A. 88-89 (1983 & Supp. 1992). 
The UPC establishes the following sliding scale: 
lf the decedent and spouse The elective-share 
were married to each other: percentage is: 
Less than 1 yr. Supplemental amount only 
1 yr. but less than 2 yr. 3% of augmented estate 
2 yr. but less than 3 yr. 6% of augmented estate 
3 yr. but less than 4 yr. 9% of augmented estate 
4 yr. but less than 5 yr. 12% of augmented estate 
5 yr. but less than 6 yr. 15% of augmented estate 
6 yr. but less than 7 yr. 18% of augmented estate 
7 yr. but less than 8 yr. 21% of augmented estate 
8 yr. but less than 9 yr. 24% of augmented estate 
9 yr. but less than 10 yr. 27% of augmented estate 
10 yr. but less than 11 yr. 30% of augmented estate 
11 yr. but less than 12 yr. 34% of augmented estate 
12 yr. but less than 13 yr. 38% of augmented estate 
13 yr. but less than 14 yr. 42% of augmented estate 
14 yr. but less than 15 yr. 46% of augmented estate 
15 yr. or more 50% of augmented estate 
26 The buyout price should not be modifiable, however, upon the remarriage 
of the dissociated spouse since a buyout is based on investment, rather than need 
or duty of support. 
27 See Allan M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in 
Divorce Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 446-65 (1987) (advocating treatment of 
human capital as marital property only when the investment during marriage is 
"substantial" and would not have occurred without the support of the spouse). 
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will ordinarily generate limited enhanced earnings and will 
trigger only a three percent buyout share. Thus, the buyout 
calculation will ordinarily produce a small buyout price when 
marital investment is small. There will be extraordinary cases, 
however, where the presumptive method for calculating a 
buyout price will be inappropriate. Consider, for example, the 
wife who marries a medical student in his last month of train-
ing. If this couple soon divorces, the wife might claim a huge 
buyout based on her husband's enhanced earnings which are 
largely attributable to his pre-marital investment. But in such 
an unusual case a husband could very easily rebut the pre-
sumption that value should be estimated through simple aver-
aging and subtracting. In ordinary cases, however, pre-
sumptively attributing enhancement in earnings during mar-
riage to marital investment will not unreasonably distort the 
buyout calculation and will afford the parties a simple, inex-
pensive, and predictable method for determining the buyout 
pnce. 
B. Three Marriages 
This contemporary partnership model can best be ex-
plained through three paradigmatic marriages: (1) the tradi-
tional marriage, (2) the hybrid marriage, and (3) the egalitari-
an marriage. 
1. The traditional marriage 
Suppose the spouses, either by decision or by default, opt 
for a traditional marriage in which the husband works outside 
the home and the wife is a full-time homemaker. In this case, 
the marital unit has invested exclusively in the husband's hu-
man capital. When the parties divorce, the husband may leave 
the marriage with enhanced earning capacity, resulting from a 
marital investment in his human capital. He thus takes the 
marital enterprise with him. When these traditional spouses 
divorce, the wife should receive a buyout of her interest in the 
marital enterprise. 
If these traditional spouses were married fifteen years and 
during this period the husband's earnings increased from 
$10,000 to $100,000, the marital enterprise would be presump-
tively valued at $90,000. Because the marriage lasted fifteen 
116 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
years, the wife's buyout share would be fifty percent.28 Thus, 
the buyout price would be: fifty percent times $90,000, which 
equals $45,000 per year. If, however, the spouses were only 
married five years and the husband's earnings increased from 
$10,000 to $40,000, the marital enterprise would be valued at 
$30,000, and the wife would receive fifteen percent of that 
value, or $4,500 per year. 
2. The hybrid marriage 
Suppose the spouses adopt a more common division of 
labor in which both parties work outside the home, but the wife 
is the primary caretaker. Because of her multiple responsibili-
ties, this wife has fewer hours to devote to her job than does 
her husband, which may result in income disparity between 
husband and wife. When this wife dissociates from the mar-
riage, she takes with her a part of the marital enterprise, mea-
sured by her own enhanced earnings attributable to marital in-
vestment. If she takes a smaller portion of the marital enter-
prise than her husband takes-i.e., if her enhanced earnings 
are less than his-she should receive a buyout. 
If the parties were married fifteen years and the wife's 
earnings increased from $10,000 to $30,000 and the husband's 
earnings increased from $30,000 to $90,000, the marital enter-
prise would be presumptively valued at $80,000 ($20,000 + 
$60,000). The wife, however, takes only $20,000 of this value, 
while the husband takes $60,000, producing a disparity of 
$40,000. Because the marriage lasted fifteen years, the wife's 
buyout share would be fifty percent. Thus, her buyout price 
would be fifty percent times $40,000 (the disparity), which 
equals $20,000 per year. If, however, the marriage lasted only 
five years and the wife's earnings increased from $10,000 to 
$15,000 and the husband's earnings increased from $30,000 to 
$45,000, the marital enterprise would be presumptively valued 
at $20,000. The wife would take $5,000 of this value with her, 
while the husband would take $15,000, producing a disparity of 
$10,000. Given the five year duration of the marriage, the 
wife's buyout price would be fifteen percent times $10,000, or a 
total $1,500 per year. 
28 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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3. The egalitarian marriage 
Suppose the spouses achieve the ideal-both parties work 
full-time and each performs exactly fifty percent of household 
chores and care for any children or other family members. In 
such an extraordinary relationship, the marital unit makes two 
equal investments-one in the husband and another in the 
wife. It might therefore appear that, because the egalitarian 
marital unit has invested equally in the spouses, each spouse 
takes one-half of the marital enterprise upon divorce and nei-
ther should receive a buyout. 
If these spouses leave the marriage with disparate en-
hanced earnings, however, a buyout may be appropriate despite 
the egalitarian nature of the marriage. There are two reasons 
for this conclusion. 
First, valuation of a continuing enterprise depends on the 
return on marital investments rather than the nature of each 
partner's contribution. If spouses are truly partners, these 
returns on joint investments are partnership returns, not indi-
vidual returns. In the absence of the parties' agreement other-
wise,29 the character or identity of the individual partner's 
contributions to the unit should not be dispositive of her share 
in partnership returns. 
Second, limiting buyouts to non-egalitarian marriages 
would invite an inappropriate debate over the nature and ex-
tent of caretaking services. If a husband could show, for exam-
ple, that he performed fifty percent of caretaking services rath-
er than forty-nine percent, he could avoid paying his wife a 
buyout. This ludicrous inquiry focuses on the wrong issue. For 
both conceptual and practical reasons, therefore, the question 
should not be identity of contribution, but rather the return to 
the marital unit on joint investments. 
As these three paradigmatic marriages illustrate, a con-
temporary partnership model provides a conceptual basis for 
maintenance under no-fault, identifies cases where mainte-
nance is appropriate, and prescriptively fixes the amount of 
maintenance, replacing the vagaries of judicial discretion with 
presumptive bright-line rules. Adoption of this contemporary 
partnership model would work a sea-change in current divorce 
29 A prenuptial agreement could fix the parties rights according to the iden-
tity or character of the contribution. 
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law by ordinarily beginning the divorce process with the pre-
sumption that a spouse with enhanced earnings owes indefinite 
maintenance to a caretaker. Such a starting point would do 
much to alter the current financial plunder of caretakers under 
no-fault. This contemporary partnership model will also usually 
deny or severely limit maintenance in marriages popularly 
thought to be inappropriate cases for maintenance, such as the 
very short marriage and the marriage later in life when income 
has already peaked. 
While most marriages may fall within one of the three 
paradigms just described, there are two variations that warrant 
special attention: ( 1) the caretaking wife who outpaces her 
husband, and (2) the childless caretaker. 
C. Two Variations 
1. The tortoise and the hare-the case of the high-achieving 
caretaker 
This contemporary partnership model will not always re-
quire the higher wage-earner to buy out the other spouse, and 
one can imagine a scenario in which the opposite result follows. 
Consider a wife who was employed as a sales clerk at the time 
of the marriage but was promoted to department manager by 
the time of divorce. Suppose that her annual earnings in-
creased from $10,000 to $25,000 during marriage. Suppose 
further that at the time of their marriage, the husband was a 
corporate officer who netted $100,000 annually, but that due to 
a negative economy, his earnings had only increased to 
$110,000 at the time of divorce. Because this wife takes a larg-
er share of enhanced earnings, she must buy out her higher-
earning husband, and while this result may seem counter-intu-
itive, it is a fair application of the principle that maintenance is 
an investment return. The logic that a partner who makes a 
good investment is entitled to its reward is no less compelling 
where the lower wage-earner increases earnings more than the 
higher wage-earner. 
One could, however, avoid the harsh effect on the lower 
wage-earner in two ways. One is by establishing a presumption 
that the spouse with the lower earnings at divorce need not 
buy out the other spouse's interest. Another is by establishing a 
rule that "catching-up is free," so that only enhanced earnings 
that exceed the other spouse's earnings at the time of marriage 
would be subject to buyout. If, for example, the wife's earnings 
increased during the marriage from $10,000 to $105,000, and 
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the husband's increased from $100,000 to $110,000, only the 
wife's excess enhanced earnings of $5,000 ($105,000 minus 
$100,000) would be subject to buyout. 
2. Cooking for two-the case of the childless caretaker 
Some commentators have advocated barring maintenance 
in childless marriages. The justification seems to be that the 
full-time, childless caretaker was the principal beneficiary of 
her decision to stay home and has already reaped her reward. 
This rationale is conceptually troublesome. Focusing on the 
quality and quantity of an individual's contribution entertains 
a curious post hoc judgment of a division of labor that the 
spouses, whether expressly or by default, agreed to during the 
marriage. Such Monday-morning-quarterbacking is also incon-
sistent with the concept of marriage as a partnership of equals 
who make different but equally valuable contributions to the 
marital unit. 
Also troublesome is the devaluation of caretaking implicit 
in the denial of maintenance to childless caretakers. Such a 
devaluation is, of course, not uncommon.30 The message is 
that caretaking has little or no value unless it is directed to-
ward a child. Cooking, cleaning, washing, shopping, entertain-
ing of friends and associates, and caring for aging family mem-
bers thus have little value. 
Although it is not often held in high esteem, caretaking is 
a valuable service that is sometimes necessary.31 Caretaking 
30 For a brief account of the glory days of caretaking as a highly esteemed 
profession, see Starnes, supra note 18, at 7:-3-75. Today, the full-time caretaker may 
be embarrassed to confess her role. The wage-earning wife may confine herself to 
the closet, daily marching to the market rhetoric of self-investment while nightly 
succumbing, in private, to the realities of unmade beds, dirty clothes, a messy 
house, and a hungry spouse and children. 
31 Responding to the needs of an infant is one example of on-demand 
caretaking. Not all caretaking services can be purchased, as they often must be 
provided at random and in small segments of time. Moreover, any purchased ser-
vices will not duplicate the services of a caretaker who initially knows family 
members and takes responsibility for providing care as it is needed. Clare Brown, 
Home Prediction in Use in a Market Economy, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY 151, 155 
(Barry Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds., 1982). Ms. Brown also notes: 
The home economy focuses on individual and family well being, and its 
personalized care and nurturing cannot be given a price tag by comparing 
the services of the home economy with what a family is willing to pay for 
occasional substitutes (e.g., child care, meals out, maid service), since the 
occasional substitute is not comparable to a permanent replacement .... 
So far the marketplace has not provided a permanent replacement for the 
120 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
is also "socially necessary" in that it produces value above ne-
cessity, thus enhancing the family's life.32 Such socially neces-
sary caretaking includes time spent in nurturing non-economic 
needs for love and self-development,33 a process that may in-
clude entertaining friends and relatives. To deny maintenance 
to a childless caretaker is to deny the value and the cost of 
many valuable caretaking functions. 
Most troublesome, however, is the devaluation of women 
implicit in a denial of maintenance to childless caretakers. A 
woman's ability to achieve the status of equal marital partner 
is made to depend on whether she has borne a child to her 
husband. Women who do not perform this function for their 
husbands are thus afforded second-class rights in the divorce 
courts. To hinge a woman's worth on her having children is an 
offensive notion with feudal overtones. Its continued viability in 
the 1990s is shocking. 
In addition to these conceptual concerns, the denial of 
maintenance to childless marriages suffers from practical in-
consistencies. The category of childless marriages is both over 
and under inclusive, since it would include a childless caretak-
er whose husband forbade her to work as well as the wife who 
gave up a career in order to relocate repeatedly with her hus-
band for the advancement of his career. This category would 
also include the childless wife who spent her days clipping cou-
pons, shopping, cleaning, washing, ironing, entertaining her 
husband's associates and volunteering her "spare" time to char-
itable causes, and who could ill-afford to contract out any care-
taking services. There is no justification for denying mainte-
nance to these women simply because they have not borne 
children to their husbands. 
In addition, if the category of childless marriages is intend-
ed to preclude maintenance to caretakers who have been the 
main beneficiary of their lifestyle, then it is under inclusive, 
because it would allow maintenance to the wife who hires a 
live-in nanny, a maid, and perhaps a chauffeur and tutor, and 
who spends her days at the country club. And what of the wife 
whose children are in school? Is maintenance available to her 
services provided in the home economy. 
!d. at 163. 
32 !d. at 15:-l. 
:i3 Examples of such socially necessary caretaking might include counseling, 
tutoring and reading to a child, organizing family outings or vacations, coordinating 
visits and holiday and birthday correspondence with an extended family, or giving 
dinner parties. 
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even if she stays home from 9:00 to 3:00? And what of the 
nonwage-earning wife whose last child left home ten years ago? 
The category of childless marriages is thus both conceptually 
troublesome and practically ill-equipped to achieve its goals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Now is the time for an honest evaluation of the costs of 
divorce to primary caretakers and for serious efforts to reform 
the law so that women no longer bear those costs alone. It is to 
be hoped that this contemporary partnership model will further 
these efforts and at the same time provide a model that encour-
ages ideal marriage in which roles are determined through 
choice rather than gender. 
